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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ORDER
ISSUED TO AMERICAN B'UYERS
INSURANCE COMPANY AND
PRODUCERS MUT.UAL INS.URANCE COMPANY, UTAH CORPQ ..
RATIONS.

Case No,

8117

BRIEF OF· APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS

An1erican Buye:rs Insurance C01npany o.f Utah and
Producers Mutual Insurance Company of Utah hereinafter designated as appellants, are both rr1utu~l benefit
associations as such are defined by the statutes of thE>State of Utah. This conclusion is cornpelled by virtu('
of the introduction and ad1nission in evidence of the
ceFtificates of authority of the two companies (R. 21-22,
17 and 42-43 and 60). No evidence to rebut tlui" pnma
f''.~ie determination was offen~d or iutrodw·P<t at thP
hearing. Section 31-31-1, U.C.A. 1953 provideR in part:
"A dul:v certified <'opy or duplicate of ~neh <·Prtlfieate
1
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(certificate of authority) shall be prima facie evidence
that the licensee is a benefit association within the meaning of this chapter." (Material in parenthesis added.)
Appellant companies are engaged. in the sale of
mutual benefit association life insurance policies to members of th-eir respective associations. The policy holders,
through a trust agreement, assign their dividends, if
any, on their life insurance policies. The trustees, in
accordance with the trust agreement, purchase stock
for the policy holders in the company designated by the
trust agreement (R. 50-51). It was by this procedure
that the securities were sold or offered in connection
with the sale of insurance.
The only issue before the Insurance Commission and
the Department of Business Regulation at the hearing
below was whether these mutual benefit associations
could legally offer and sell securities along with and in
connection with the sale of insurance (R. 18 and 85),
Appellants both admitted that they were selling securi~
ties in conjunction with the sale of their insurance
policies (R. 25 and 46).
The appellants were duly licensed to sell securities
and both companies introduced into the recor~ osrtified
copies of their "Certificates of

Registration~' i~sued

by

the Utah Securities Commission (R. 58, 58a, 58b, 61, 61a
and 6lb). The sales force of both companies are licensed
both as insurance agents and

sec~rities

salesmen (R. 32

and 50).,
2
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Counsel for the Statf' of Uta.li stipulated that there
was ''no question involved in this matter of solvency of
these firms." (R. 114-115).
After the conclusion of the hearing before the Insur.
ance Commission and the Department of Business Regulation, an or-d~r was entered directing the appellants to
cease and deFiist witlun ten days, "from. selling, offering
or promising to give, or allowing in any manner whatsoever any shares of stoek or other securities issued or at
any time to be issued or any interests OJ" rights therein
in connection with or as an inducement to the purchase·
of any insurance or insurance type benefit." (R. k7).
Thereafter an appeal was taken to the District
Court where by stipulation (R . 127) all partie~ agreed to
submit the matter to the Di8triC't Court for determination upon the record made in the hearing before thP
Department of Business Regulation and thf' InsurancP
Commission. Thereafter the District Court by ttf' order
duly entered affirmed the above order of the Department
of Business Regulation and the InsurancP Comrnission
(R. 155). This appeal is taken from. the order of the
District Court.

SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR
The order of the Department of Business Regulation and the lmmrance Commission of the State::~ of Ptah
is in error in the following particulars:
(a) The Deparbnent of Bnsine~8 1-{egulation, tht-·
Insurance Department of the State of L t.ah and thf'
Distric-t Court. as a matter of law erronf'ou:-;1 y concl ucJ._,

3
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that petitioners are insurerH and persons as defined by
the Insurance Code of the State of Ulah, and thereforP
they are subject to the general in~urance code.
(b) The Department of Business Regulation) th""
Insurance Department of the State of Utah and the
District Court erroneously conclude that pf>t1tioners arp
bound by Section 31-27-15 and 31-717, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
(c) The Department of Busine~s Regulation, thP
Insurance Department of the. State of Utah and thP
District Court have failed to recognize the special treatment to which petitioners are entitled by reason of holding certificates of authority to engage in the in~urance
business as Mutual Benefit Associations.
(d) The Department of Business Regulation, the
Insurance Department of the Statt- of Tltah and tht>
District Court have totally disregarded Chapter 31, Ptab
Code Annotated 1953, and in particular Sections 31-1-14
and 31-31-15 thereof
(e) The Department of Business Regulation, the
Insurance Department of the State of Utah and the
District Court have disregarded pertinent. and controlling decisions by the Utah and Supreme Courts of other
States.
(f) The sale of seeurities by petitioner~ in conjunction or in connection with the· sale of insurance han been
theretofore considered and approved by the Insurance
Corrunission and had by petitioners been carried on for
.in excess of two years, with the full knowledg~ and
approval of thP ln~urancP Commi~sion.
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(g) Said Order t~ void, arbitrary and capricious
and without any support or foundation in the record o.t
at law,
ARGUMENT
I
APPELLANTS ARE MUTUAL BENEFIT
ASSOCIA_TIONS.
On the present state of the record it must bP conceded that appellants are mutual benefit associations
as such are defined by the Statutes of the State of Utah.
This conclusion is compelled by virtue of the introduetion and admittance in evidence of the certificates of
authority of the two cmnpanies and the fact that no other
evidence in rebuttal of this prima facie determination
was introduced at the hearing. See 31-31-l, UCA 1953.
See also, State v Royal N eighborr;; of Arnerica,, 44
New Mexico 8, 96 P. 2d 705 (New Mexico 1939), At Page
709 the Court diseusses the effeet of a duly eertified eopy
or duplicate of the license as proof that the company
was a fraternal benefit society. In fact the Court went
far beyond anything necessary to these appellantf- in
establishing their status. The New Mexico Court went
so far as to hold that when the particular company
involved was l]censed as a fraternal henefit society ib
status was irrevocably established for the particular
period involved.
The record in this ease establislH:':-: t h.., fac1 .. w1thnt11
eontradiction, that appellants are m;ut~u,al bwne{lt assor:uJ,
5
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tio1't.S, which associations are authorizPd to wnt~:> varwu8
kinds of insurance. The first sentence of Section 31-3110, Utah Code Annotated 1953, refers to "contracts of
life insurance" issued by these assomations, Rection
31-31-11 limits the "amount of insurance" risk which
these associations may assume. Thus appellants are by
statute special kind~ of companieH or association~
engaged in writing limited policies of insuranc~. The
faet that they are incorporated, and th~ fact that thPy
are successful[;y writing insurance for the mnnben nf
the association does not alter tbeir ~tatutory natnr~.
They are still m1tt'ual benefit associations,

THERE REl\IAIN~ FOB. DISGGSSION, THEN,
THE SOLE QlTESTION AS TO WHF.THER. IT J~
[LLEGAL FOR APPELLANTS, AS MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS, TO SELL SECURITIES IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE lSSUA:\CE OF' POLl
CIES O.W LIFE INR.URANCE
II
.MUTUAL BENEFIT AS-SOCIATIONS ARE
EXEMPT FROl\1 THE GENERAL
INSURANCE CODE.
Prohibition against seeurity sales in connedJOlJ with
insurance sales is elaimed by the Attorney Gew:.ral'::;
Office by reason of Sec.tions 31-717 and 31-27-1~>. T:CA
1953, and also by reason of the Supreme Court of Utah
decision in the case of Utah Associaf1on of L1ff' UnderJrriter.s v. ]J1ounta?m· State.;; Life ln.surance. Co ;,~ [tah
579. 200 P. 67:3.

6
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Conver~ely, appellants da~rn ~xempt.~«JIJ_ il'om th~
OeneraJ Insurance Law~ of the state, and particular!)
the above cited section~, by reason of 31-:~1-15 UCA 1953,
which read~ as follows

''Exemptions from other proVIsions of code.
-Except as provided in tbiEo chapter, every such
association shall not be subject to the other provisions of th1s code unless the context elear]y
indicates applicability to such association.''
Appellants urge to thi~ Commission the applicability and determinativeness of tht' deciswn by the Utah
Rupreme Court in the ea~P of Rrodduck, by Srrt.ith v.
Paczfic Woodmen. Life Associ.atunt., 89 Utah 7;), ;)-1: p_ 2d
1189. In this case the plmntiff ~ued a~ benefwiary of a
eertifieatP of fraternal benefit insurantl-- issued on th~
life of his father. The defendant association denied
liability on the ground that eertain :'tatt->nwnb ntade b)
the assured in his application for immrance were warranties and since they were untrue they thereby voided
the policy'. By General Insurance ~tat~t(-' of the Stat(-'
of rtah it is provided that the policy ~hall <'Onstitutp thp
entire contract between thP parties and that all statements made by the insured shall, in tht- ah~encf' of
fraud, be deemed representations and not warrant1~:-.
The defendant association contended that inasmuch a:-it was a fraternal benefit association it was therefon·
not subject to the General Insurance Laws. The Suprenw
Court held for the defendant. assof~iation> stating that
by reason of Revised Statutes 1933, 4:~-9-4, 4~i-l-l, fraternal benefit societies were not sub.Jt>C1 to the general
provisions of the Insurance CodY.

7
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Appellants earnestly submit that while in the Pacific
Woodmen case the company involved was a fraternal
organizati?n, as distinguished from appellants who are
mutual benefit associations, still the legal proposition 1:::
th~ same. Both classes of organizations enjoy a statutorJ
exemption from the General Insurance Laws of Utah.
There is no, reason for this Court to make a distinction
between a fraternal organization and awy other type of
exempted organization by hono,ring one exemption a;n.d
disallowing the other.
Indeed the cases have not made any such distinction,
as evidenced by the fact that exemption has been granted
to the following~
See State Ex Rel Cor~Jner, Attorn.ey Generalv. West.
ern Mutual Benefit Association, 47 Idaho 360, 276 P. 37
(Idaho 1929). In this case the Idaho Supreme Court
held that the Western Mutual Benefit Association wai'
exempt from thP General Insurance Statutes of the ~tate
of Idaho, despite the fact that the company did not have
a representative form of government; that it wasn't
governed by the lodge system; that it did not have an
initiation or ritualistic form of work; and that the benefits it paid were not confined to a limited class of persons. The Court held this company to be a benevolent
order or society, which, under the laws of Idaho, was
granted an exemption from the General Insurance Code.
See also, Neighbors of Woodcraft v. Westover, 99
Colo. 231, 61 P. 2d 585 (Colorado 1936). In this case
the Colorado Supreme Court held thai the company was
a fraternal society operating on the lodge plan, and that.
8
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1t. had. tH-·~n adm.itteci tc' do hu;0;ines~ in Coh>ra.d{' a~

n_

fraternal benevolent society, TliP General Insurance
Laws of tlie State provided that the suicide of a policyholder after the fin;t. year should not be a defense against
the payment of a policy. This general provision relating
to suieide was directed by the tenns of the statute to
the policies of "any life insurance company." 'rhere wa~
a proVIsiOn in the general Colorado Insurance Statut~:-.
as fol1ows ·
''This aet shall not apply to fraterna! benefit
defined tn Cha~lt.f•l J3 11 ol u..... law:-.
passed at tlie 18th Besswn of tht- Oeneral A~~ . .~m
bly of tbt> State of Colorado~. PXCPpt a~ thr· rein
otherwise expressly provided.,.

~ociPtiP~ al'

The Court held that it was the consi~tPnt intention of tbP
legislature to exempt fraternal benefit ~o(•tetie~ fron1 t h~->
operation of thP general insurance law~ of the statt~.
See also, Na.tionoJ A1d L1jij Assotiatt.on 11 Abbott,
17V. Okla. 319, 62 P. 2d 982 (Okla. 1936). Th1s ca::w
involved a mu.tual benefit r·ompwny Th1- qttP~tion beforE"
the Court was whether the General Tllf;Urane.e Laws of
the State of Oklabon1a applied to th1~ t~Tpe of eon1pany
The Court cited prior de(~isions with rPsped to fraternal
benefit ~ociHiP~ wherein the C()nri had held that hy
virtue of thE' intention of the legislature tht'~P eompaniP~
were exmpt from tlw genera] im·mranef-' law~~ and thPn
said:
"The Fraternal Benefit Act and thP ;\1_utual
Benefit Aet are of such eharacter that wp havP
no hP~itane~, m applying- t.he ea~f· of Natwnal

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Benevolent Society v. Russell insofar as it affects
Section 10-519." (This section has to do with the
operations of mutual benefit companies.)
Thus the Court held that the mutual benefit company
was not subject to the general insurance laws of the state.
See also, Fidelity Life Association v, Hobbs, 161
Kansas 163, 166 P. 2d 1001 (Kansas 1946), In this case
the Kansas Supreme Court held that it was the intent
and purpose of the legislature to place fraternal benefit
societies in a class by themselves, make them amenable
to conditions, and subject them to regulatory powers and
supervision different from those of insurance companiPi'
in general. See particularly the discussion at 166 Pac.,
2d., Page 1006.
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the
rnutual benefit associations are not the only organizations granted exemptions under the Utah Insurance Code.
[n this regard note the following sections under UCA
1953:
31-32-23
31-21-18
31-30-3
31-29-4

applicable
applicable
applicable
applicable
tions.

to cooperatives.
to mutual fire companies.
to hospital service plan.
to fraternal benefit associa

It is worthy of note that even though cooperative
associations are granted the exemption by the section
above cited, still by Section 31-32-22, UCA 1953, srud
cooperative associations, their officers, directors, agents
and employees are subject to all the provisions of Chapter 27 of the Code, and Chapter 27, of course. contams
one of the prohibition sections upon which thP Attorney
10
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General places reliance, There i6 no refer~nce anywhen:
in the chapter of the code relating to mutual benefit
asso'Ciatio'Yls which requires that said associations comply
with Chapter 270
If the Attorney General's contention is sound that
the legislature intended these unusual organizations and
associations to be bound by the general regulatory provisions of the Insurance Code, why, then, did the legislature specifically enact Section 31-32-22, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 ~ Certainly the fact that the legislature
specifically directed that cooperative insurance companies must comply with all of the provisions of Chapter
27 of the Insurance Code must have indicated that without this specific mandate these companies would not have
been subject to this chapter of the Code.
In connection with these various statutory exemp .
tioris particular attention is called to Section 31-1-14
UCA 1953, which reads a~ fol1ows:
"Construction of code--Particular paramount
over generaL-Provisions of this eode r·elating to
a particular kind of insurance or a particular type
of insure-r prevail over- provisions relating to insurance in general or insurers in general."
Now let us discuss Section 31-31-1, wherein
stated:

lt lS

"]~very association (nmtua] benefit aHsociation)* * * which desires to do ~mch a bu~ine~t-' in
this State shall comply with all the requirernent~
and provisions of this chapter, and r he Gene raJ
Insurance Laws of Utah relative to -;aid a.r...·soc~o
tion * * *." (Italics added.)

11
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The Attorney General apparently wi~he~ this Court to
ignore the meaning of the word "relative." ~hh:; word
cannot be ignored since to do so requires the interpreter
to completely disregard and wipe out the effect uf 3131-15. Acceptance of the word "relative" in the context
in which it is used results however in a reasonablP
'
interpretation of the two sections,
and 'this is amply ~mpported by the case law on the subject, that each statut~
is to be construed so that the whole is tnade hannonious.
Scrutinizing the various legislative enactments also
furnishes some light on this matter. Initially the mutual
benefit insurance- section. first appeared in lb~ Code iJ.
1935. It. should be observed that at the dat.t-C of df'(~Js(on -rr~
the M oum.tain,. 8 tate..'; Life I rbSurance Co'rnpo;ny case (1921) i
which is heavily relied upon by the Attorney General,
there were no statutory provisions for mutual benefit
associations in the State of Utah. Furthermon\ the·
Mountain States Life Insurance Company was not a
domestic mutual benefit association and did not clau11
to be. Thus, since the statutes before the. Court in that
decision were entirely different from those now on the
books in the State of Utah, and since subsequent to the
decision by the Utah Supreme Court in ihat ease th~
legislature saw fit to amend the insuranee law~ extensively~ we feel that the case has n.o bearing al aU 01'~
rnu,tual benefit associat£on companies, Let us enlarge
upon these statutory changes referred to in the precedJng sentence.
As before stated, Laws of TTtah 1935, Chapter 41,
Ranctioned mutual benefit associations. [n 1941 the legis-

12
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latur~-: enacted Section 43-ll~lj (i). wherein mutual bene=

fit associations were specifically prohibited from offer~
ing, giving, or selling securities in conjunction with the
sale of insuranceo At that precise time the Insurance
Code definition of "insurance company" included "all
corporations, associations, partnerships and individuals
engaged as principals in the insurance business, ·excepting fraternal and benevolent orders and societies/' 43l-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943), Also at that same time
'insurance companies" were then prohibited from offering, giving or selling securities in conjunction with the
sale of insurance by virtue of the general prohibition
found in Section 43-3-33 and 34, lJtah Code Annotated
1943. Nevertheless the legislature in 1941 enacted the
special prohibition found in Section 43-11-13 (i) mentioned above.

By the Laws of r tah 1947, not only was Section
13(i), Chapter 44, Laws of 1941 (the section prohibiting
mutual benefit companies from selling securities in con~
junction with insurance) removed, but. there was added
the exemption section, 43-31-15, Utah· Code Annotated
1943, Pocket Parts, which section has been retained and
carried forward from that date to the present, where it
now appears as Section 31-31-15, Utah Code Annotated
1953. So we have a legislative history wherein nmtual
benefit associations were in 1941 expressly subjected to
the prohibition against selling stock in conjunction with
the issuance of life insurance policies, and a ~nb~~ttuPnt
removal of that specific prohibition from th(" d1u1 •t.P.r pertaining to mutual benefit associations. Conc111 n-·ntly wttll
the removal of the prohibition Wf-' find th..- legislaturf>

lB
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enacting for the first time the section exempting mutual
benefit associations from the General Insurance Code.
It cannot be supposed that the legislature's action8 w~re
meaningless. The mandate of the legislature seems plain
and unambiguous; namely, that these mutual benefit
associations shall not be subject to the other provisions
of the Code unless the context clearly indicates wppltcability to such assO'ciatiovn.
The Attorney General argued below that since the
appellants were engaged in the assumption of insurance
nsks, and were "persons'' as defined in the general insur"
ance Code that they were necessarily therefore subject
to the entire insurance code. Appellant companies do
not deny that ·they are engaged in the assumption of
insurance risks, nor do they deny that technically they
are "persons'' as defined in Section 31-1-9, ITtah Code
Annotated 1953. But they do point out that mutual benefit associations are not subject to the other provisions
of the Insuranc~ Code, unless the context. clearly indicates applicability to such association. If by virtue,
alone, of the broad definition of "person" and "insurer"
these associations are to be brought under section 31-27
15 Utah Code Annotated 1953, then by the same token
each and every section and chapter of the general Insurance Code would likewise apply to these respondents.
This follows because all parts of the general Insurance
Code, without exception, apply to and govern either
"persons" or 'insur~rs." Such a construction would
therefore completely nullify and wipe out the language
of section 31-31-15, exempting these companies from the
rernaining provisions of the Code. That such a construe14

I
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I

twn

was never intended by the legislature l.k manifest

Our own Supreme Court. very clearly recites the rule
whichgoverns a case such as this in Board of Education~
,_i.

Bryner, 57 Utah '78, 192 Pac" 627, at 629 (Utah 1920),

Our Supreme Court there said;
"It follows that in order to deterntine thl='·
intention and purpose of the lawmaker, and io
harmonize conflicting provisions where such
occur~ it at times becomes necessary for' the courts
t.o expand or to restrict the ordinary and usual
meaning of words, phrases, or clauses fonnd in
a particular section or statute~ In that connection.
it is also neces~::~ary to observe thP cardinal rulP'
of construction that every word and phrase rnu~t
be given some force and effect ]f possible, and
this notwithstanding the fa(•.t that in doi.ng. ~o the
effect of the particular section or statute may
t:hereby be enlarged or restricted as the case may
be. When, therefore, the language of a ::;ef'.tJon or
statute is ambiguous and doubtful, and on reading
the language there ls douht whether it ~hould bt<:·
applied in accordance with its ordtnary and usual
meaning or whether it should reeetv~ an enlarged
or restricted construction and effect, it i~ the duty
of the courts t:o looks beyond the statutP if by
doing ~o they can better determine th~ intPntwn
and purpose of the laWinakers. ~Ion~ovet, a.~ a,
meanS Of :tSCertatning the trUe intention Of tJ1P
laWlnakers, it may also be rt-ecessa.ry to i:nq,,~_fir<-'
into and sca;n the history of the pa~rtic1dar 8la.tu.ttim, question, mnd ~n. connectio11, therewith CO'~''"''''d (·.·r·
the ,general purpose of the lawmakers i-n fo-r'l'tt'Ulo
tilng and passing law.s 'l4rp01'~· a p·artic·ula-r· s·ubJPrf
and that is particularly true in. cases 'Where. d·rf
ferent sections or provision.~ rela. tinp to the sam"f,
S1J,bject-matter are conflictmg or am,hi_qu,o·us ''
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The legislative history of this prohibition against
selling securities with insurance has already been recited
in this brief. However as conclusive evidence that the
legislature itself is not in accord with the position that
mutual benefit associations are, merely because they are
"insurers", subject to the general insurance code provisions governing insurers, we call attention to section
31-31-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953. This section specifically requires that agents of mutual benefit association~
must be licensed pursuant to Chapter 17 of the Insurance
Code. An examination o~ Chapter 17 readily discloses
that all persons authorized by an ''insurer" to solicit.
applications for insurance are agents, who must be
licensed by the Commission. Thus, if the attorney general's argument is sound, all agents of mutual benefit
associations were required to be licensed by virtue of
the provisions of Chapter 17. The legislature, however,
did not believe this to be true, as they enacted a specific
section applying to agents of mutual benefit associations.
Again we must conclude that there was a reason for the
enactnwnt of Section 31-31-12, Utah Code Annotated
1953. The obvious reason was that without the enact-

ment of this section, the legislature had concluded that
agents of mutual benefit associations would not be required to be licensed by the Insurance Commission.
We submit that this legislative history compels the
conclusion that by repealing Section 43-11-13 (i), U.C.A.
1943, and at the same time granting mutual benefit

asso~

ciations an exemption fron1 the general Insurance CodP
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(31-31~1f).

Utah Code Annotated 1953). left these com·panie~ free to offer) seek~ or give securiti~--~ in eonjunction
w 1th lht> ~altt of .:.nsnrarwe
Almost immediately after the legislature, in 1947
deleted the prohibitiOn against the sale of stock in conjunction with the sale of insurance frorn the mutual
benefit association chapter of the Code~ the Insurance
Department was called upon to n1akf; a contemporaneous
ruling,. As the Insurance Commission well knew certifi
cates of authority were issued to appellant mutual bent>
fit associations and their policie~ were approv~d by the
Insurance Department. At th~ same time, the Business
Regulations Cmnmission, through Jts S.-.euntles Divis10n
and the Jnsuran(~e Divu~:wn, wa:- fully awar~ qf the faf't
that appellant mutual hrm~fit a~~oc•Jatlon:.; werf' offering
gtock in (~OnJunction with the ~ale of thP-n insurancf-"
policies-. ThiB IS all a. 1natter of public rPcord tn tht"
Insurance Comnn~sH,n The law book~ ar~-> full of ('asP~
holding that the pra(~twal 1nt1--rprnat10n~ by th~-' depart.
ment of government charg-eri with the udm.mi:-:tratwn or
enforcement of a parti<>:rllar law ar~· Pnt:Itlxd to th~-"
highest respect from thP c·,··u rlK Thl~ ruil=' ~~ part WlJ
larly tnw when th.-. arlrnim~trahvP determ1natwn (;:-.; con-temporaneou~ with tlu-· fir~t working 1)f tb ... 8tat•JtP
There ar<:> sound rPa::-;on8 why thP Court~ giVf-'. such gn--at
weight to thesf' praetieaJ eonternpnraneous rulings ol (:1 n
administrative body. They have been reeited as follow~

1. The respect due the adn1inistrativf' authority.
2. The officerl" concerned are usually abh, men and
masters of the subje<>t
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3. The same men are frequently the draften~ of th~
law they are called upon to interpret.
The officials of the Insurance. Commission that
approved the activities of appellants for the past several
years were just such men as described above. If the
Courts attach such great weight and significance to
administrative rulings because of the foregoing reasons,
how much more appropriate it would seern that the Insurance Commission should have attached the same weight
br,, 1ts own previous rulings and determinations, particularly in view of the legislation which is now on the book~
and the legislative history already set forth in this brief.
For a complete discussion of this rule of law, that public
administrative rulings are entitled to weight, see 42 Am.
Jur., Page 392, et seq. See also, Decker v. New York
Life Insurance Company, 94 Utah 166, 76 P. 2d 568, at
572. Surely this Court will now honor this established
rule of law.
Another factor which should not be overlooked in
consideration of this problem is that the Utah Supreme
Court, as long ago as 1894 in the case of DOJmiher v.
Grand Lodge A.O.U. W., 37 P. 245, ruled that a fraternal
eompany doing general insurance business in the State
of Utah would have its policies construed and determined by the general law applicable to mutual life insurance corporations. Subsequent to this early decision of
the Utah Supreme Court the legislature saw fit to step
in and modify the ruling in the Daniher case. Thus our
legislature has specifically provided that several kinds
of associations are exempt from the General Insurance

18
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Laws, We must presmne that the legislature was fully
aware of the Utah decision in the Daniher case and that
their subsequent exemptions granted to these various
groups and associations was so that the Daniher decision
would not continue to be the law of the state.
During the course of the oral argument below the
Attorney General and counsel for the intervening hff'
underwriters remarked that appellants were in effect
attempting to en~joy complete irrununity from all thf',
insurance laws of the ~tate which placed thP, appellant.~
in a much more favorable position than oiher companies
writing ~imilar Insurance. We respectfully direct the
Court's attention to the fact that any ~uch immunity .i~
narrow and well defined. and moreover mer~ly qualify
1ng for. the imrnunity plar~es r·Prtai n burden~ and lunita.tions upon thoi5P organizati()ns ~o qualifying., and als<1
upon the agent~. officPrs. and i-:'ruployef>::-. that work fm
them
The appellants must cornply with tbf' provisww- of
Chapter :)1, which, anwng other tlnng~. providt- that H
minimum. of 300 person~ must hav~ applied 1n writ1n12
to said association for member~hip and ben~f1t~ therPin.
or at lra~t $200,000 of m~un:trlt~t- bf'n~~flt~-- wn~t have tn.,~->1
applied for_ Also. a hond in thf' penal ~urn of $~,001)
must be t>xeeuted and (•f'rtai n r0gu;;tration and examrn;.}tion fees must be paid dependent upon the number of
members or insurance in force" Chapter ~1 also place~
a limit of $3,000 on any one risk that a beneflt association
may assume, and amounts in excess thereof are only
permitted by reason of reinsurance, Pl(·. These are all
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limitations that are applicable to tuutua.l bt-mefll a~l"oe.w
tions as distinguishPd from legal I'P~~rvt-> life insu ran~P
eompanies.
There is nothing new or novel in creating what at.
first blush appears to be advantageous position~ for
designated and well defined organizations. As heretofore noted, the Utah Insurance Code itself, in addition
to mutual benefit associations, sets up many different
types of organizations, namely fraternal benefit, cooperatives, mutua] fire companies, etc. Without fear of contradiction, appellants believe it can safely be -stated that
every state in the union, to a greater or lesser degree,
has substantially identical legislation. Perhaps t~e Utah
legislature granted these exemptions in an effort to
stimulate the organization and growth of loca] eompanie~
whose capital and surplus would ren1ain m thP ~tate and
aid our economic growth. _Whatever the reason, the
legislature has granted these exemptions.
Nor are these exempting statutes confined to state~
alone as witness the advantageous federal tax treatment
accorded to charity institutions, insurance companies~
cooperatives, and building and loan societies to enmpPrate a few. All such organizations enjoy what may
appear to be definite advantage~, yet, all art> properly
excluded and exempted provided they have complied
with the statutory definitions authorizing their existence.
These statutory enactments are, of course, m.any and
varied, and the restrictions and limitations therein contained must be complied with or the apparently favored
position will be lost. But who can say whether such a
20
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position ~~ in. truth ''favored''. Perhaps rnerely compli-ance with the statutes involved is suffieiently onerou~
so that. others will not choose to be bound. To permit
the mutual benefit associations 1n compete or actually
to exist, the legislature n1ay deem it necessary to exelude
them. and other similarly situated organizations from
certain general provisions of the law. If it is found that.
the exclusion or exemption is too broad, the cure for thi~
condition must be accornplished through artion of the
legislature. An excellent exarnpl~ of the curtailment of
a once granted exernption n1ay be found in the comparatively recent action of the Congress of tJ,e ·united
States so far as the ta."{atwn of cooperatives and HavingR
and loan companies are concerned.
During the argt.unent before the In8uraw~t> Commi~
swn and the District Court the Attorney General and
the attorney for tht- intervenor eompanif>:- inferrAd that
tlH. re was something inherently wrong or f-'Vll eonneeterl
with appellants sales activities and operations In thf.
first place, then~ i~ nothing in thi~ .record to justify arry
such inferenceH. There is nu qtw:'\tion of ~olvenc~· of
appellant eornpani.es ( R ll~-11;>) involved in th1~ case
The proeedurp fntlo"ved by hoth <•ompanit::>~ is almost
identical \\'ith that ~Pt forth in the ea~e of Comme·rcwl
Life lnsnrnnce ('omfHlYII/..J r J;Vnyht. 6-l Arizona 129, :t f)h
Pac. (2d) 943 (Arizona Hl46). \\'p quotP frorn t!n:::; <~a::..;p
at page 950-951 "
!~I!.!;.. c,or.sidering the. efft:'et of the agreen1en\
resort to the following general prineiples of law
is not only helpful but determinative of the issues
herein. These general princ1ples are:
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" 'It Inay be laid down a~ a broad generaJ
rule that the right to receive money du~ or to
become due under a contract may be assigned,
even though the contract itself may not be assignable. * * *' 4 Am. Jur., Assignments, section 14.
H '* * * an assignment of a debt not yet due
and which may never becom(l due is effective if
it appears that there is an existing contract or
employment out of which the debt 1nay arise, * •
*.' 2 Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition,
page ll83.

" 'Except as stated in section 151, a right
expected to arise in the future, under a contract
or employment in existence at the tin1e of the
assignment, can be effectively assigned.' 1 Restatement of the Law, Contracts, vol. 1 sec. 154.
" 'It has been held that * * * dividends belong
solely to the insured and Inay be secured by hil:'
creditors. * * *' 2 Appleman on Tnsuranc~ Law
and Practice~ sel'o 1345, pagi B01:i _
"The trust agreement i~ without taint of
illegality. It is an agreement by which oertain
trustors, being policyholders in Cmnmercial Benefit, and being entitled by virtue of their policies
to share in any dividends which may be declared
by Commercial Benefit, assign such future dividends, as they become payable, to the bank and
agree that when a sufficient trust fund exists they
will accept, in return therefor, the capital stock
of petitioner. The agreement is made upon a. sufficient consideration, and without doubt the holder
of an ·insurance policy may assign to another the
money to become due under the terms of the insurance contract, whether by dividend or otherwise.
"We do not believe that there is any merit
to the contention of the Attorney General that
22
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tl1P benefit company by accepting- assignment~
would be engaging in a.ny illegal act, not JfO,par
d1zing tts assets to the inJury of it~ certificatf:'
holders. The benefit company does not agree with
the Commercial Life to deliver to the trustee th~:<.
surplus dividend from tts mortuary fund, Th~
9enefit company mereJy consents to the assignment by such of its policyholders a~ may choosf~
to executr. the trust agreement, and agreed tf•
pay their div1dends to the tr·ustee Thr~ Corporatwn Commission ha~ complete. pnwu t•, :-;~t that
benefit eorporations charge proper premiums for
benefit certificates issued and create nut of pre-.
miums paid mortuary and r~serve fund::- ~uffJ.
•::it-':n1 tu pavhenefitdaim~ and g·f'twra~ ••f't"l"liltn_u:
expenses,''

Wf> emphasize that in thP, case now hPfor~-> th.t~ Court~
tht-r-f' ts likewise no taint of illegality,. 1 n~olvPncy, or
injury to the public~ involved There t~ onf' and .·nly
one question before thP eourt and that l~, a r·~ appellant
eompan1es ~-'Xt>mpt frow SediOn8 :H 21 1:J and :31 7-17 .,
U C.A. 1953. ] t is not pr·oper for th :.:-- Cuurt tf, perrnrt
th~ Insurance ConnnJ;;;~Joner to detPrnn;lf '-'·hat 1~ w ''d.
and bad, and what is in thf-· 1nt~:>n-·:-.t of (•r>na111 e )frr·
panie~ and thr general publw, That t:-. a f"urt<'i.!un of th..,
legislature alone
1

~

('<)~(~Lr_;siON

fr, (~oncluswn, we should hiH' to 1·itf· two l·a:--1·~ ..vhlCh
we believe dearly show the pr-oper rulf~ m a rrmt.ter of

thi::- kind.
Tn Stat~

'

Ro:tJaf /'v'p_1ghho·r,

of A'rntrica,, 4+ ~~, l\L ~l\J ex11 ... 19:~9) tht:> Cour~.

96 P 2d 705 ;j t l'ap;e 709 ( l'\ PW
makes thl~ vPry pertinent ~-d.<:~tPmer, f,.:
1
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"It may be that the line of dentarcatwn bPtween the character of policy written by the old
line insurance companies and fraternal benefit
societies has become less distinct as the years haw~
passed and the business of insuring the lives of
its members has become the major purpose of,
and largely the justification for, the existence of
fraternal benefit societies. It may be true that
the state, by legislation that sets these defendants
apart from the field of insurance companies
generally, has failed to sense what plaintiff so
ably urges to be a fact, viz., that such societies
no longer substantially perform functions of
genuine fraternal societies; that they are not
organizations with subordinate lodges where ar.-.
taught ~nd exemplified lessons of fraternal
brotherhood, charity, morality, good citizenship
and other kindred subjects. It may be true that
today less attention is given to the ritualistic and
fraternalistic work espoused by the lodge and
more to the solicitation of insurance anwng the
membership; and yet, admission of these facts
would still not favor a different status for defendants.
"Paraphrasing somewhat the language used
by the Arkansas court in the case of Modern
Woodmen of America vs. State, supra: 'It may be
true that these societies have in a large measure
departed from their original purpose of much
fraternalism and small benefits for that of small
fraternalism and large benefits, and that they
have taken on many of the characteristics of old
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h n~, 1 nsurance t~ompani·~:-; > 'But, .it has substantially complied with the statutes of th.is state>'
thP court went on to say, 'and whether it may conhnue to operate as a fraternal beneficiary society
m this state presents a question addressed to thP
general assembly and not to us.'
''The legislaturP has provided for adrnisswn
into this state and license for such fraterrial bene-fit societies. The definition WP accept did not
always have legislative sanction; hut, regardles:;.
of that fact, both before and after the enactment.
of the fraternal code of 1921, thP determtnation
of the status of defendant~ b:v the Superintendent
of Insurance~ the one agrnty legally authorized
by statute t(l waki-"; ~nd: d_tterminati('n~ he(~arne
finaL Any question a~ to the wt~dorn of ~etting
up by legislation the di~tmdwn thu~ made 1~ nor
for the eourh;. ''
h

~hould.

be noted tha1

pn,blem which

IS

fraternal benefit
h;l\v~

ance

tbt~ c:a~e mv1.lve~

tht' very type ot

bPfOrt> this Court, that
~ociety ~~ su h.w<·.t to

L~,

whether a.

the g·en'"' r-aJ insur

of tlw state

The other case to which we refer
Association v Hobb.s, lnl
(Kansas 1946) Agam

thi~

Kansa~

Ii-i

F'ideli.ty L'iff>

163, 166 P, 2d 1001

t:-; a case Involving the precis~

pOint of law present before thu~ Coqrt~ that i~, whether.
the genera] 1nsuranc(:> law~ of thP statf' ::~pply to an

exem_pted association, Lf:>t
Pag-~

Ut-'

quote fn·rn tlti.,- dP<·.tsion r:~J

1006.
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"'However, we are equally mindful of otht-or
Legal principles applicable to the commissioner of
insurance which are just as fundamental, if not
more so, as the ones to which we have last rPferred and are so elemental as to require no citation of authorities. One is that the Legislature
makes the law and that its fiats must be observed
by him. Another is that the statute is the source
of his power and all of his acts must be within
the limits of the authority it confers upon him.
Still another is that it is the province of the courts
to construe the statute and, when called upon to
do so, determine the scope of his official authority. And lastly, another is that it is not for th(:'
<~ourts to substitute their judgment for that of
the Legislature but to give its enactments the
force and effect the language found there111
requires.
"That it was the intent and purpose ot the
Legislature to place fraternal benefit societiP~ in
a class by themselves, make them amenable to
conditions and subject the1n to regulatory powers
and supervision different from those of insurance
companies in general cannot be a subject of doubt
when 40-201, to which ~we have already referred,
is carefully read and critically analyzed."
Thus, we would suggest that whether mutual benefit
aRsociations are to be permitted to sell stock in conjunction with or in connection with the sale of insurance is
a question which has been determined for the present
h,· the legislature.

If there are those who believe that
26
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thi8 policy is in error, t.ht:} remedy is legislative-not

judiciaL Those who would tl•t->refore invoke a prohibition
against the sale of stock in conjunction with the salt
of insurance by mutual benefit associations should be
directed by this Court to take their problem to the legislature as the state of the laws at. present clearly indicates
the controHing policy now in effect
Respectfully submitted,

MULLINER, PRINCE & MlJLLINER
By SEATON PRINCE
Counsel for .American Buyer~
Insurance Company of Utah
RICH, ELTON_& MANGUM
By MAX K. MANGUM
Counsel for Producers
Mutual Ins. Co. of 1Jta.h
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